For physical-layer authentication, the authentication tags are often sent concurrently with messages without much bandwidth expansion. In this paper, we present a channel coding approach for physical-layer authentication. The generation of authentication tags can be formulated as an encoding process for an ensemble of codes, where the shared key between Alice and Bob is considered as the input and the message is used to specify a code from the ensemble of codes. Then, we show that the security of physical-layer authentication schemes can be analyzed through decoding and physical-layer authentication schemes can achieve some degree of information-theoretic security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Message authentication codes (MACs) are cryptographic primitives used extensively in the construction of security services, include authentication, nonrepudiation, and integrity. Basically, message authentication is to ensure that an accepted message truly comes from its acclaimed transmitter. When the transmitter intends to send a message, it also generates a MAC, which is a function of the message and a shared key, known only to both the transmitter and the receiver. The generated MAC is often appended to the message [1] . At the receiver, a MAC is computed from the received message and compared to the MAC that is transmitted. If the two MACs are identical, then the transmitter is identified as a legal user and it is highly likely the received message is exactly equal to the one transmitted.
MAC algorithms can be constructed from other cryptographic primitives, such as cryptographic hash functions or from block cipher algorithms. Currently, the security of MAC algorithms rely on the hardness of hush functions, i.e, given the message and its MAC, it is "hard" to forge a MAC on a new message.
As the development of mobile communications, ensuring security of wireless communications has becoming increasingly important. Openness of wireless networks makes them vulnerable to spoofing attacks where an unauthorized user masquerades as another legitimate user. Although conventional cryptographic security mechanisms can be used to foil such attacks above the physical layer [2] , [3] . However, it was believed that more efforts should be done to prevent potential innovative attacks since the wireless medium offers novel avenues for intrusion. In recent years, there has been various efforts [4] - [7] in authenticating the sender and receiver at the physical layer, based on prior coordination or secret sharing, where the sender is authenticated if the receiver can successfully demodulate and decode the transmission. Among various reported works, it was commonly observed that the physical properties of the wireless medium are a powerful source of domain-specific information that can be used to complement and enhance traditional security mechanisms [4] .
In [6] , a physical-layer authentication scheme was proposed, in which MACs, along with messages, are transmitted concurrently over the physical layer. Compared to the traditional transmission approach above the physical layer, the authors claims the possibility of information-security due to the introduction of the noise. However, this is not justified in a rigourous way.
In this paper, we provide a channel coding approach for physical-layer authentication. Our contributions include two aspects. Firstly, the computational security can be expressed as the requirement for decoding complexity. Secondly, the information security for physical-layer authentication schemes can be measured by the conditional equivocation about the key, which can be strictly nonnegative. It is also interesting to formulate the key recovery error probabilities for any adversary using the standard techniques for a converse proof of channel coding theorem [8] .
Throughout this paper, upper case letters (e.g., X ) will denote random variables, lower case letters (e.g., x) will denote realizations of the corresponding random variables. and calligraphic letters (e.g., X ) will denote finite alphabet sets over which corresponding variables range. Also, upper case boldface letters (e.g., X ) will denote random vectors whereas lower case boldface letters (e.g., x) will denote realizations of the corresponding random vectors.
II. A CODING FORMULATION OF PHYSICAL-LAYER AUTHENTICATION

A. Physical-Layer Authentication
Suppose that Alice and Bob agree on a keyed authentication scheme that allows Bob to verify that the messages he receives are from Alice. In order to authenticate, Alice sends an authentication tag (or a MAC), along with a message, for declaring his identity. We call the transmitted signal under this scheme as the tagged signal.
Formally, Alice, as the sender, wants to transmit the authentication tag T together with the message S so Bob (as the receiver) can verify her identity. In general, the tag is a function of the message S and the secret key K
where τ : S × K → T is a (hash) function.
In order to focus on the essential ideas, we assume here that both the message S and tag T can be denoted as binary random vectors with BPSK modulation. In what follows, we do not discriminate between binary and bipolar vectors, as it can be well understood from the text.
Often, the tag is a short string computed on the message S to be authenticated and the shared secret key K. Let L s , L k , L t denote the length of the message S, the key K and the tag T , respectively. In practice, L s ≫ L t . Here, we always assume that L s = QL t , where Q is a large integer.
The tag is padded to the message and simultaneously transmitted. The tagged signal (in a discrete column vector form) can be written as
where 0 < ρ s , ρ t < 1, ρ 2 s + ρ 2 t = 1, and t q = ψ(t) is a modulation process for modulating a binary tag string t into the physical discrete-signal vector t g , which is chosen to meet E[s H t q ] = 0 [6] . Hence,we can interpret ρ 2 s and ρ 2 t as energy allocations of the message and tag, respectively.
Essentially, for concurrent transmission of both message and tag, the bit string of a tag should be transmitted with a much lower rate ( 1 Q ) than the message symbol rate. In [6] , the Haar wavelet is employed for modulating tags. In this paper, we, however, assume a simple repetition function of ψ(·), namely, each component of t is repeated Q times, which means that
This is employed for ease of analysis. By assuming an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model, the received signal vector at Bob can be written as
where z is assumed to an AWGN vector. As | ρs ρt | ≫ 1 and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is sufficiently high, the transmitted message is assumed to be completely recoverable (often enhanced by error-correcting codes) for both Bob and Eve. Therefore, one can assume that the transmitted signal vector s is known to both Bob and Eve.
When s is available at the receiver, it can cancel the message from the received signal samples and the message-free version of a tag can be retrieved [6] , which takes the form of
where x = t and w is the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise vector with variance E[w † i w j ] = δ ij γ −1 t I Lt and γ t denotes the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) observed by the authentication tags.
B. A Coding Formulation
Given a message s ∈ S, it is possible to generate a code C(s), which comprised of 2 L k codewords, namely,
where each codeword c k (s) = τ (s, k) is indexed by a possible key k ∈ K with k − 1 = κ(k) denoting the decimal number expression of the binary vector k. There are |K| = 2 L k codewords. Now, the code rate of C(s) can be defined as
Consider that Alice wants to authenticate with Bob, she normally sends a message s, and then a tag c k (s) = τ (s, k) is generated using the shared key k. Equivalently, the generation of the tag for a given message s can be considered as an encoding process of
As the message s is generated according to a finite message set S, one have to consider an ensemble of codes
This ensemble of codes Ω(C) is revealed to both Alice and Bob. From a standard cryptographic view, this code ensemble is also revealed to Eve.
Definition 1: The minimum Hamming distance of the code ensemble Ω(C) can be defined as
where d H (c 1 , c 2 ) denotes the Hamming distance of two binary vectors c 1 and c 2 . Now, the task of physical-layer authentication can be formally formulated as a hypothesis testing problem as follows.
♣ Bob decides if y is from Alice or not by assuming that s, k, τ (·, ·) are available; ♠ Eve tries to retrieve k from y by assuming that s, τ (·, ·) are available.
III. HYPOTHESIS TESTING
A. General Formulation
To complete the authentication process, Bob requires to verify that whether the response signal y is from Alice or not. If the response signal is not from Alice but Eve (an impersonation attacker), it is assumed that Eve generates length-L k binary random vector k E for authentication as there is no any information about k A (= k B ) available. Essentially, this is cast as a binary hypothesis testing problem:
where K denotes the acknowledged key. Hypothesis testing is the task of deciding which of two hypotheses, H 1 or H 0 , is true, when one is given the value u of a random variable U (e.g., the outcome of a measurement), namely, U = u. In our case, U = (Y, K), u = (y, k B ). We begin with the formulation of the optimum binary hypothesis testing, i.e.,
We point out that in the case of H 1 , the generation of the message and key is independent to each other as there is no means to efficiently gauss the key.
As the message s is assumed to be available, it is clear that
with t = τ (s, k).
In general, this binary hypothesis testing problem in its optimum form can not be easily tackled as it requires to enumerate 2 K binary vectors of k with a priori uniform distribution. However, its performance can be informationtheoretically bounded [9] , which is summarized as follows.
B. Detection Probability vs. False Alarm Probability
Let P D = 1 − α be the detection probability, namely, the probability of successful declaration of H 0 when H 0 is actually true, and P f = β be the false alarm probability, namely, the probability of false declaration of H 0 when H 1 is actually true.
Let the function d(α, β) be defined by
With optimal hypothesis testing (12), its detection probability and false alarm probability are closely connected.
Lemma 1: [9] The detection probability 1−α and the false alarm probability β satisfy
where I (Y ; K) denotes the mutual information between two random variables Y and K, and
for two probability distributions f (x), g(x).
C. A Suboptimal Solution
As the optimum hypothesis testing is difficult to implement, we propose to use a simple test statistic
and ζ is further compared to a threshold value ϱ for making a final decision, where c B = τ (s, k B ) is the codeword due to the input of k B at Bob.
This approach can be viewed as a code acquisition approach encountered in code-division multiple-access (CDMA) communication systems, where c B can be considered as a unique PN code, which is available at the sides of both Alice and Bob, but keeps unknown to any potential attacker.
In both hypotheses, η is the sum of L t normally distributed random variables, which is still normally distributed. Therefore, it suffices to compute its mean and variance.
In the case of hypothesis H 0 , one can show that
We denote its mean and variance as η 
where
It is clear that η|H 0 ∼ N (η 0 , σ 2
H0
) and η|H k
. The authentication is typically claimed if η ≥ ϱ. The threshold ϱ of this test is determined for a false alarm probability β according to the distribution of η|H 1
The detection probability can be simply computed as
IV. A DECODING APPROACH FOR SECURITY ANALYSIS
For a physical-layer authentication system, we can characterize it using a quadruple {S, K, Ω(C), p(y|x)}. In this paper, we always assume a memory-less channel and hence, p(y|x) = ∏ Lt i=1 p(y i |x i ). Consider a passive attacker, Eve, who only monitors all frames inside the network during authentication, and tries to learn k B from whatever it gets.
Firstly, we consider the noiseless setting as in a classic authentication application above the physical layer, in which Eve can directly acquire the signal s and the tag y = τ (s, k B ) .
Given s and if the encoding rule τ (s, ·) : K → T is a bijection, Eve can recover the key k by generating a lookup table of size 2 L k and searching over this table for finding the key k E , which admits y = τ (s, k E ).
In the language of coding, it means that the recovery of key can be considered as decoding of the received signal Y to its maximum possible encoding inputK(Y ). Given s, if any decoderK(Y ) is of computational complexity O(2 L k ), we claim that the computational security can be achieved for this authentication system. Definition 2: (Computational security) Given a physicallayer authentication system {S, K, Ω(C), p(y|x)}, we claim that this system is computationally secure if for any decoder K(Y ), its computation complexity is of O(2 L k ).
For ensuring computational security, it requires that no any efficient decoding algorithm exists for any code C(s) ∈ Ω(C). Since the publication of Shannon's original paper in 1948, the search of the codes for achieving the channel capacity has come a long way. Currently, linear codes and their efficient decoding algorithms have been extensively studied. Therefore, for construction of a good physical layer authentication system, linear code ensembles should be better avoided as their complexity can often be reduced due to the linearity of codes.
Secondly, we consider the noise setting, as seen in the physical-layer authentication scenarios. 
If Pr(k ̸ = k A ) = 0, we claim that the authentication key is ML recoverable.
In what follows, we consider a binary-input continuousoutput AWGN channel (Bi-AWGN). Its capacity C 2 (γ t ) is a function of the signal-to-noise ratio γ t , which can be explicitly expressed as
where β = √ 2γ t . The SP59 bound of Shannon [10] provides a lower bound on the decoding error probability of block codes transmitted over the AWGN channel. With a coding approach for physical-layer authentication, the best possible decoding probability with ML decoding for a potential eavesdropper can now be lower bounded with the Shannon's 1959 sphere-packing bound.
Theorem 1: (The 1959 Sphere-Packing Lower Bound [10] ) For a physical-layer authentication system, characterized by the quadruple {S, K, Ω(C), p(y|x)}. Let a message s ∈ S be sent, and the authentication tags are assumed to be transmited over a Bi-AWGN channel with the signal-to-noise ratio of γ t . For any decoderK, it is clear that K → τ (s, K) → X → Y →K form a Markov process. Let P e = Pr(K ̸ =K), we have that
The SP59 bound is exponentially increased with the block length and the exponent is strictly negative for all R c > C 2 (γ t ), it become clear that above capacity the minimum probability of error goes to 1 exponentially fast with the block length. Hence, one can achieve the information security for physical-layer authentication, which, however, not the case for classic authentication.
Numerically, we'll show that the decoding error probability can go to 1 even with short block length if the signal-to-noise ratio γ t is sufficiently low.
Theorem 2: (Lower Bound on the Conditional Equivocation about the Key) Consider a physical-layer authentication system {S, K, Ω(C), p(y|x)}. Let a message s ∈ S be sent, and the authentication tag is assumed to be transmited over a Bi-AWGN channel with the signal-to-noise ratio of γ t . When Eve (an potential adversary) has observed a single physical tag, her equivocation about the key is lower bounded by
where L k is the key length.
Proof: As the mutual information per channel use between the observation at the side of Eve and the shared key 
Let
it follows that H(K|Y ) ≥ δH(K). Hence, the successful probability for an eavesdropper to guess the key is about 2 −δL k . Clearly, δ is a lower bound on the normalized equivocation (relative to the entropy of key).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider a physical-layer authentication system, in which binary key is of length L k = 128 and the authentication tag is of length L t = 256. To attack this physical-layer authentication system, a potential eavesdropper tries to do her or his best to decode the key. As one can consider the block codes of rate R c over a Bi-AWGN channel of the SNR γ t , the equivalent E b /N 0 can be defined as Fig. 1 shows the SP59 bound on the decoding error probability and detection probability (successful authentication rate) for different E b /N 0 's. As the eavesdropper cannot do better than a ML decoder, the SPB bound provides an overestimate of its capability on guessing the key. As shown, the eavesdropper becomes hopeless in guessing the key whenever E b /N 0 is below to about -1 dB as the decoding error probability is around 1. However, the authentication system does work well with almost perfect successful authentication rate. In simulations, the threshold is set so as the false alarm probability is lower than 0.01. Fig. 2 shows the lower bound on the normalized conditional equivocation, as determined by (30). At E b /N 0 = −3 dB, H(K|Y ) > 53. Hence, the successful probability for an opponent with an unlimited power of computation to guess the key is about 2 −53 .
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a channel coding approach for physical layer authentication. With this new approach, the computational security for classic authentication schemes can be well formulated using a new decoding approach. The well-designed physical-layer authentication can ensure a new degree of security, namely, information-security, thanks to the introduction of channel noises during transmission.
For design of a physical layer authentication system, the success authentication rate should be balanced with an acceptable false acceptance rate. It is beneficial for use of long tags, as the success authentication rate can be enhanced while the false acceptance rate can be reduced. In the meantime, numerical results show that even with short tags (of length 256), the best possible decoding error probability under ML decoding can approach 1 while the authentication system still works well.
